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IS "FULL FAITH" DIVORCED FROM DIVORCES?
T aE Constitution of the United States requires that each
state shall give full faith and credit to the judgments,
public acts and records of the other states. The first occur-
rence of the words "full faith and credit" in our constitu-
tional history, however, is to be found in the fourth of the
Articles of the old Confederation. It declares that "full faith
and credit shall be given in each of these states to the records,
acts and judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates
of every other state." There never was any doubt in the
minds of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention that
the people whom they represented would cheerfully relin-
quish the sovereign right of determining as an independent
question the effect to be given judgments and records of the
other states. Whatever opposition might have arisen respect-
ing the surrender of other powers and the relinquishment of
rights, there was unanimity on this question. If there was to
be established a more perfect union, it was realized that there
must exist in the national government power to demand rec-
ognition as to judgments, records and acts of the different
states. Mere comity would be too uncertain and indefinite,
depending more or less on local factors of interest, prejudices
and the like. Perceiving the necessity of giving control over
this important subject to a single government, Congress also
was authorized to prescribe the manner in which such acts,
records and proceedings were to be proved and the effect
thereof to be given. The Congress promptly and within one
year after the ratification of the Constitution passed a stat-
ute concerning the manner of proving judgments of other
states and providing that they shall have such faith and
credit given to them in every court throughout the United
States as they have by law or usage in the courts of the state
from which they were taken. In interpreting both the Con-
stitutional provision as well as the statute, Chief Justice
Marshall stated: ' "The judgment of a state court should have
the same credit, validity and effect in every court in the
United States which that judgment had in the state where it
was pronounced and that whatever pleas would be good to a
2 Hampton v. McConnel, 3 Wheat. 234, 235, 4 L. ed. 378 (U. S. 1818).
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suit thereon in such state, and none others, could be pleaded
in any other court in the United States." Thus it has been
held, if a court of another state has jurisdiction, its judgment
must be granted full faith and credit, although the judgment
was based on a contract directly violating the public policy
of the state where the suit thereon was brought. The require-
ment that only those defenses which would be sufficient in
the state where the original action was brought has been fre-
quently overlooked in matrimonial cases. The courts in the
second state refuse to give due recognition to the judgment
on the ground that the plaintiff had practiced fraud on the
court where the action was originally brought. The facts con-
stituting the fraud, however, are generally based on the brief
period of residence required and the plaintiff's departure
from the state immediately after the marriage is dissolved.
While these facts might fully convince the court of the second
state, the real question is whether the court in the state where
the original action was pending would deem them sufficient
to vitiate the decree. Particularly is this true when such
judgment was rendered on defendant's default in appearing
in the action. Unless this test satisfactorily appears, the
court in the second state is failing to give that full faith and
credit required by the Constitution and the statute.
In the past there have been relatively few questions aris-
ing under this provision of the Constitution. The people real-
ized its necessity and the courts have found little difficulty in
deciding cases and controversies arising thereunder. Except
for the power of compulsory recognition, the effect of the
Constitutional section was not to lessen or add to the sover-
eign powers of an independent state. Thus it has been held
that the authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted
by the territorial limits of the state in which it is established.
Any attempt to exercise authority beyond those limits would
be deemed in every other forum an illegitimate assumption
of power and be resisted as mere abuse.2 No state can exer-
cise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or prop-
erty without its territory. The several states are of equal
dignity and authority, and the independence of one implies
the exclusion of power from all others. And so it is laid down
2 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1877).
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by jurists, as an elementary principle, that the laws of one
state have no operation outside of its territory, except so far
as is allowed by comity; and that no tribunal established by
it can extend its process beyond that territory so as to sub-
ject either persons or property to its decisions. "Any exer-
tion of authority of this sort beyond this limit, is a mere
nullity, and incapable of binding such persons or property in
any other tribunals." 3
In Pennoyer 'v. Neff,4 the Court held that a judgment in
personam rendered against a non-resident was not valid where
there was no personal service of process, no voluntary gen-
eral appearance and no prior attachment and levy on prop-
erty owned by the non-resident defendant and located within
the state. Although a state possessed the authority of an
independent state over persons and property within its terri-
tory, the exercise of authority beyond this limit would be
regarded as a nullity and incapable of binding persons or
property in other states. The full faith and credit clause did
not in any way enlarge this power. The judgment, therefore,
based on such procedure was not entitled to recognition by
other states.
The full faith and credit clause and foreign divorce de-
crees may be considered under three general headings. First,
there was the case of Athertoni v. Atherton5 where the divorce
decree was obtained in the state of the parties' last matrimo-
nial domicile. The wife, defendant, had left the state of Ken-
tucky and returned to her parents' home in New York. The
stay-at-home husband instituted the action pursuant to the
laws of the state of the matrimonial domicile. Constructive
service of process was made upon the absent spouse and in
due time a divorce was rendered in plaintiff's favor. In a
subsequent cause brought by the wife in New York, the hus-
band appeared and as a defense interposed the divorce he had
recovered in Kentucky. The United States Supreme Court
held that New York must give full faith and credit to this
decree, the action being treated in the nature of a quasi in
3 STORY, CONFL. LAWS § 539.
4 See note 2 su~pra.
5 Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155, 21 Sup. Ct. 544, 45 L. ed. 794
(1901).
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rem proceeding-the matrimonial domicile being considered
the res in such action. The idea that the marriage relation
created a res within the state was a fiction. It was created
and existed only long enough for the court to dissolve it, but
it, nevertheless, had the effect of giving the court jurisdiction
and not violating the principle of public law that one state
was attempting to project its laws and affect persons domi-
ciled elsewhere.
The next phase is shown by the case of Haddock v. Had-
dock.6 In this case, the last matrimonial domicile was the
state of New York. There the husband left his wife and estab-
lished his domicile in the state of Connecticut. He subse-
quently instituted an action for absolute divorce in that state.
His wife had never left the state of their last matrimonial
domicile, New York. In the Connecticut action, she was
served by publication but never appeared therein and a de-
cree of divorce was entered in the husband's favor. Later on,
the wife instituted an action for separation against the hus-
band and he relied on the Connecticut decree as a defense.
The United States Supreme Court held that the judgment
was not entitled to full faith and credit, the theory being that
since the matrimonial domicile of the parties was never in
the state of Connecticut, that state acquired jurisdiction only
of the person of the plaintiff. While Connecticut did have the
right to determine the status of the husband, it had no au-
thority to project its decrees into the state of New York so as
in any way to change the status of the stay-at-home wife.
In the recent case of Williams v. North. Carolina.,7 the
United States Supreme Court has overruled its former deci-
sion in the Haddock case so that the third phase seems at
present to be that the state dissolving the marriage, assuming
the personal domicile of the plaintiff has honestly been estab-
lished in said state, dissolves it as to both husband and the
absent wife. The Court argues that there can be no such
thing as a husband without a wife, or a wife without a hus-
band and the necessary effect of the judgment is to dissolve
the relationship as to both. It is argued that there is nothing
6 Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 26 Sup. Ct. 525, 50 L. ed. 867
(1906).
7Williams v. State of North Carolina, 63 Sup. Ct. 207 (1942).
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in the Constitution requiring as a condition precedent to the
full recognition of the decree that the court must take notice
as to which party is in the wrong. In other words, a spouse
leaving his state of matrimonial domicile with his kit-bag
full of troubles, not big enough to warrant a dissolution
there, may travel to some distant state where the law does
not require such a large bundle. If he in good faith estab-
lishes his personal domicile in that state, he may then begin
an action for divorce and on constructive service of process
obtain a decree which becomes guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion as to its validity and effect throughout the other forty-
seven states.
The facts in the Williams v. North. Carolina case war-
ranted the following findings. The defendant, 0. P. Williams,
married Carrie Wyke in 1916 in North Carolina and lived
with her in that state until May 1940. The defendant, Lilly
Hendrix, married Thomas Hendrix in 1920 in North Caro-
lina and lived with him in that state until May 1940. At this
time, the defendants left their homes, their respective spouses
and their state and appeared in the state of Nevada on May
15, 1940. On June 26, barely forty-two days after establish-
ing their residence at the Alamo Auto Court on the Las
Vegas-Los Angeles Road, both defendants filed bills of com-
plaint for divorce through the same lawyer and alleging
almost identical grounds. No personal service of summons
was made on the home-staying-spouses in either case and the
service was by publication and substitute service. Both ob-
tained decrees of divorce. Nevada's policy for dissolving the
bonds of matrimony may be gleaned from defendant Hen-
drix's case. Her grounds were: "extreme mental cruelty" and
she established them by testifying that her husband was
"moody"; did not talk or speak to her often; when she spoke
to him, he answered most of the time by a nod or shake of
the head. There was nothing cheerful about him at all. The
latter of the two divorces was granted on October 4, 1940
and on that day in Nevada, a marriage was solemnized be-
tween the defendants and they shortly thereafter re-appeared
in the state of North Carolina, setting up housekeeping as
husband and wife. They were subsequently tried and con-
victed in a criminal prosecution of the crime of bigamous
1943 ]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
co-habitation. The defendants pleaded the decrees of the Ne-
vada court and the failure to accord the same full faith and
credit resulted in a reversal of their conviction in the United
States Supreme Court.
In all of the cases coming before the United States Su-
preme Court on the question of the recognition to be given to
foreign divorce decrees, the Court has never considered the
question of its own jurisdiction. Whether or not there is a
case or controversy presented and arising under the Consti-
tution of the United States and the laws made pursuant
thereto, apparently has never been raised nor has the Court
in limine considered this objection. In these actions, it is
true there are adverse parties, there are pleadings, infre-
quently facts in issue and terminating by a final decree or
judgment. In raising this query, there is an appreciation
that the judgments provided for under Article IV, Subd. 1,
were never limited to the proceedings in law or equity that
prevailed only in 1789; that forms of action might change is
recognized as was the case of declaratory judgments. When-
ever the judicial power of the federal court is invoked to re-
view a judgment of a state court, the ultimate Constitutional
purpose is the protection of rights arising under the Consti-
tution and laws of the United States.8 This can and must be
done by the exercise of the judicial function. Hence, changes
merely in form of procedure by which federal rights are
brought to final adjudication in the state courts are not
enough to preclude review of the adjudication by the Su-
preme Court. The converse is true, to wit: If the protection
of rights under the Constitution and laws of the United
States does not appear, jurisdiction is not acquired although
the case retains the essentials of adversary proceeding in-
volving a real controversy, that is finally determined by the
judgment of the state court.
It is submitted that neither under the Articles of Con-
federation nor the Constitution did the people of the United
States intend to vest in the national government supervisory
powers over the dissolution of the marital relation and to
find that it was the price the people paid for surrendering to
8 Nashville, Chattanooga & St Louis Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249, 53
Sup. Ct. 345, 77 L. ed. 730 (1933).
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the federal government compulsory recognition of judgments,
public acts and records cannot be sustained.9 When the Con-
stitution was adopted and ratified, courts possessed no juris-
diction over the subject matter of divorce. Cooley, in his
Treatise on Constitutional Limitations, says:
The granting of divorces from the bonds of matrimony was not con-
fided to the courts in England, and, from the earliest days, the colo-
nial and state legislatures in this country have assumed to possess the
same power over the subject which was possessed by the parliament,
and from time to time they have passed special laws declaring a disso-
lution of the bonds of matrimony in special cases.
Rent, in his Commentaries, says:
During the period of our colonial government, for more than a hun-
dred years preceding the revolution, no divorce took place in the
colony of New York, and for many years after New York became an
independent state there was not any lawful mode of dissolving a mar-
riage in the life-time of the parties but by a special act of the legis-
lature.10
When, therefore, the people surrendered their rights as to
the effect to be given a judgment of one of the states, it could
not be construed to include the dissolution of the marital
relation. Courts lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter
and there could exist no justiciable issue. Judgments cov-
ered controversies in law or equity which were known to the
framers at that time. On the other hand, this was a consti-
tution and not a code of laws that the people were ratifying
and it must have been understood that changes in form as
well as subject matter might be expected. The people did not
anticipate that the judicial branch would be crystalized into
the forms of procedure or even subject matter that existed in
1789. Growth was expected here as well as in the other two
departments of government. So when states provided new
9 Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, parties to a divorce
action do not have to rely on the full faith and credit clause in those cases
where the court rendering the decree has jurisdiction of the parties or jurisdic-
tion of the matrimonial domicile. This amendment nullifies and makes void
state action -of every kind which impairs the privileges and immunities of the
parties and deprives the parties of liberty and property without due process of
law. If a court of another state refused to recognize such decree, the injured
party would be entitled to protection by the federal government.10Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190 (1888).
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types of actions or different procedure, full faith and credit
would be required as to the new judgments. This construc-
tion, however, does not justify the assumption of power over
divorces. Divorces existed at the time the clause was adopted
and if federal control were intended, provision must be found
at that time. If no control existed in 1789, then justification
for the exercise thereof can only be predicated by reason of
subsequent amendment conferring such authority.
This may be illustrated by the "privileges and immuni-
ties" clause which like the "full faith and credit" clause ap-
peared in the Articles of Confederation and was incorporated
in the Constitution under Article IV, Section 2, as follows:
The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immu-
nities of citizens in the several states.
The constitutional provision did not create those rights which
it called privileges and immunities nor did it profess to con-
trol the power of the state governments over the rights of its
own citizens. Its sole purpose was to declare to the several
states that whatever rights as you grant or establish them to
your own citizens or as you limit or qualify, or impose restric-
tions on their exercise, the same, neither more nor less, shall
be the measure of the rights of citizens of other states within
your jurisdiction. There could be no claim or pretense that
those rights depended on the federal government for their
existence or protection. 1 So, if at the time of the adoption
of the Constitution there were no such thing as a judgment
of divorce, it would be the vainest show of learning to at-
tempt to prove by citation of authority, that in the absence
of amendment, rights might subsequently arise and depend-
ing on the federal government for their existence or pro-
tection.
If justification for compulsory recognition of divorces is
not found under the "judgment" provision may it, neverthe-
less, exist under the "public act"? In this connection one
must note an important change that was made between the
clause in the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution.
The former provided that full faith and credit shall be given
11 Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. ed. 394 (U. S. 1872).
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to the "acts" of the states. Under the Constitution the indefi-
nite term was made more concise and specific and limited to
"public acts". Divorces were never granted by public acts
but required special acts. Therefore, when the Constitution
was adopted the people expressly reserved to themselves the
recognition of acts of other states, enacted by special laws
and this included absolute divorces.
The marital status, therefore, since it was not surren-
dered to the national government, vested in the states. The
states were supreme in determining the conditions under
which marriages might be contracted and under what circum-
stance they might be dissolved. Any attempt by one of the
states to change the status of a citizen of another state, would
constitute a gratuitous assumption of power which did not
exist. If the people of the respective states subsequently
vested the right to dissolve the relationship in the judicial
branch of the state government, their acts could not vest a
right in the national government which heretofore did not
exist. If this were the case, then the supremacy of the people
as to this subject would terminate and be acquired by the
national government. But, rights are not acquired under the
Constitution in such ways and a sovereign does not become
divested by a change in the manner of enforcing the same.
This principle has been demonstrated frequently in respect
to the exercise of federal powers. It would seem that a judg-
ment of one state purporting to change the marital status of
a person domiciled elsewhere does not present a "right" aris-
ing under the Constitution of the United States and the laws
made pursuant thereto. Recognition is entirely a matter of
comity and not Constitutional compulsion.
The framers of the Constitution must have realized that
by permitting the states the right to exercise sovereign power
over the marital relation conflicts would frequently result
among the states. The people living in one state might favor
strict grounds for divorce whereas other states might favor
liberal laws. With the vast territory to be developed into new
states, they were definitely aware that the differences would
increase.
To appreciate this situation in these modern days one
need only note the differences existing between the two states
1943 ]
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involved in the Williams case, to wit: North Carolina and
Nevada. Comparing those outstanding events which are
proudly emblazoned on the banner of the people of the one
state with the events justly boasted of by the people of the
other leaves no doubt in the mind of the uninformed person
where the "easy" divorce might be obtained. These are some
of the outstanding facts about North Carolina :12 It is one of
the thirteen original states; it is primarily an agricultural
state; in the St. James Episcopal church is a 450-year-old
painting of Christ taken from a pirate ship in the old town
of Brunswick across South River; it was next to the last of
the thirteen original colonies (1789) to enter the Union, de-
manding a clause guaranteeing religious freedom before rati-
fying the Constitution; the Roanoke Island Settlement be-
came the "Lost Colony" of the Roanoke; Virginia Dare was
born there (August 18, 1587), the first white child of English
parentage born in the New World; the first Christian bap-
tismal sacrament known to have been administered in Amer-
ica took place on Roanoke Island with the baptism of the
friendly Indian chief Manteo.
Nevada is the least populous of all the states. Until the
discovery of the famous Comstock Lode (1859) the inhabi-
tants of Nevada numbered only about 1,000, chiefly Mormons
and California gold seekers who had tarried on the way.
After the discovery, there was a stampede of fortune hunters
from all over the country. The population of Virginia City
spurted from a few hundred to 30,000. Bonanzas were struck
and developed, men became wealthy beyond dreams over
night. By reason of the short period of residence required
for divorce suits, Nevada has become a popular resort and
the city of Reno has become the center of that activity. Games
of chance have been legalized.
The framers of the Constitution neither expected nor
hoped for uniformity. They realized the type of people with
whom they were dealing, a type of people so fittingly charac-
terized by the Honorable Winston Churchill in his radio
address of March 21, 1943:
12 The facts as to North Carolina and Nevada are taken from "The World
Almanac", pages 361 and 358, 1942.
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We must beware of trying to build a society in which nobody counts
for anything except the politician or official; a society where enter-
prise gains no headway and thrift no privileges. I say "try to build"
because of all the races in the world, our people would be the last to
consent to be governed by bureaucracy. Freedom is their life-blood.' 3
Predictions of dire results to follow the William case
will not be wanting. They were also made after the decision
in Haddock v. Haddock and in both cases they were in the
first instance voiced by the dissenting members of the Court.
However disappointing it may seem, the average citizen will
fail to grasp the "intensely practical considerations" involved
in these matrimonial mix-ups. So long as the golden wedding
anniversary is "featured" as an incident of the obituary
notice, our society is safe and cannot be expected to manifest
much concern over the transient matrimonial members there-
of and their offspring, if they have any. The jurisdictional
question is important if it results in the denial of one of the
few remaining state sovereign rights.
WiuaM TAPLEY.
13 New York Herald Tribune, March 22, 1943.
